According to the Financial Times, Abdul Qadeer Khan wept bitterly upon hearing the news of Pakistan’s embarrassing defeat. But he still had to work and pay his bills. “Shopping for Bombs” explains that he obtained his job at FDO on the recommendation of his advisor, Prof. Brabers. This prestigious appointment was the best Khan could hope for — definitely better than a position as an obscure academic. FDO was a subcontractor of the Dutch-English-German consortium UCN/URENCO, which produced equipment for uranium enrichment.

There were a few issues with Khan’s appointment to FDO. As the Financial Times notes, much of the organization’s research, especially on ultracentrifuges, was considered sensitive, even though it was for peaceful nuclear energy, not bombs. Thus, Khan was barred from sensitive projects at the request of the Netherlands’ intelligence agency, the BVD. But there seemed to be little risk of espionage. Khan’s wife and in-laws were Dutch, his daughters were Dutch, he spoke fluent Dutch and was well-integrated into Dutch society. He was also not a Soviet, making him an unlikely candidate for a communist spy. Khan was cleared to start work at the lab.

Abdul Qadeer Khan and Frits Veerman (pictured) had become friends. According to IPFM, Veerman frequented Khan’s house for dinner and was considered a family friend and confidant. According to the Financial Times, the two co-workers played tennis on their days off. Khan dropped his guard around Veerman, even telling his colleague that he kept a gold ring as “pocket money” if he needed to “leave quickly.” It would soon become clear what Khan meant.

In 1973, Veerman noticed drawings and plans of centrifuges and other classified material scattered around Khan’s house. At first, Veerman was puzzled. But his suspicions soon proved correct when Khan asked Veerman to photograph sensitive materials for him, which he refused. Veerman also overheard Khan’s calls with Pakistani embassy officials, and he decided to blow the whistle. But Khan was his superior. The head of FDO had known Khan as a student and hired him on Prof. Brabers’ strong recommendation. He had even allowed Pakistani delegations to tour the plant and take discarded centrifuge parts back home. According to IPFM, FDO ordered Veerman to burn evidence in his possession and leave Khan alone. FDO eventually fired Veerman in 1978.

IPFM notes that in 1975, the Dutch government noticed a series of suspicious transactions that FDO could no longer ignore. The Pakistani embassy in Brussels had placed orders for parts that matched components used in classified URENCO centrifuges. Veerman’s hunch had been proven correct. Khan had committed industrial espionage and was passing URENCO’s secrets to Pakistan.

Contrary to Lubbers’ fears, Abdul Qadeer Khan had no interest (yet) in sharing his pilfered designs with America, Japan, or anyone else. His goal was a nuclear-armed Pakistan to counterbalance India’s capabilities in the subcontinent. According to the Financial Express, Khan had written to Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto in 1974, offering to build a Pakistani nuclear bomb. Despite Khan’s obscurity, Bhutto accepted the offer and set Khan up with a lab called the Khan Research Laboratory (KRL).

Khan faced a number of problems. Initially, he was able to obtain parts from European suppliers, but many of these were quickly banned for export. Khan found an ingenious workaround. He simply ordered sub-parts and duplicated the equipment in Pakistan. Khan’s brother couriered designs and other information from the Netherlands on KLM flights. Equipped with a diplomatic bag, he was exempt from customs searches. The gulf states bankrolled Pakistan’s nuclear program through shady Pakistani banks, and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi helped Pakistan obtain uranium from Niger when Germany shut off supplies. So Pakistan was hardly alone in this venture.

The program was a resounding success. In 1998, Pakistan conducted its first public nuclear tests at Chagai. But there were repercussions. According to Global Security, the United States cut Pakistan’s foreign aid in 1977. The Conversation notes that across the world, there was the fear of nuclear proliferation among hard-line Islamic states following the Iranian Revolution of 1979. These fears became justified when it was later discovered that the KRL had given material to U.S. rivals.

According to the Arms Control Association, the United States knew of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s activities by 2000. But U.S. president George W. Bush decided to drop the issue in 2001. According to NTI, Bush did not press Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf about Khan’s activities nor request access to the scientist, who was by now a Pakistani hero. Why? According to a CRS report, Pakistan was a key U.S. ally in the recently-begun War on Terror in neighboring Afghanistan. NTI notes that hunting Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban was considered of greater importance, so Khan remained a free man.

2003 would prove a turning point in Khan’s life. That year, U.N. weapons inspectors searched the Iranian nuclear facility in the city of Natanz. According to Global Security, the inspectors discovered that Iran had been assembling P-1 and P-2 centrifuges in the facility. No link to Khan and the German models from Almelo, right? Not exactly. According to the Carnegie Endowment, the KRL had modeled these centrifuges on the German prototypes Khan had worked with in the Netherlands. Thus, Iran could only have obtained this specific technology through Khan’s network.

That same year, the Italian navy stopped a ship carrying Malaysian centrifuge parts. According to the BBC, it was bound for Libya, presumably as part of Libya’s nascent nuclear program. Once again, the components of the ship matched those used in Pakistan and URENCO. Caught red-handed, Gaddafi renounced Libya’s nuclear program and possibly tipped off the United States as to the cargo’s origins. Khan was once again in the spotlight.

Although Abdul Qadeer Khan did not act alone, his own words indicate that he was more than happy to commit nuclear espionage and proliferation. Writing in Newsweek, Khan defended his actions as protecting Pakistan from Indian “nuclear blackmail.” Pakistan could not be left at the mercy of a nuclear armed India and expect such an arrangement to end well. A nuclear-armed Pakistan would not have lost half its territory in 1971. So what was Khan’s opinion on proliferation? Khan noted in Newsweek that no nuclear-armed state has ever been invaded or occupied. A nuclear-armed Iraq or Libya “wouldn’t have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently.” In this regard, Khan was correct, as both of his former clients (the Iraqi deal fell through in 1992) have fallen victim to regime change wars. Perhaps Khan really believed that nuclear proliferation would result in a more peaceful and restrained world.

Today, Khan is a regretful man. According to Indian Newspaper Awaz, Khan bemoaned placing nuclear capabilities in the hands of the corrupt Pakistani military. It seemed to him that the Pakistani army no longer felt threatened by India, and was instead focused on holding its own people hostage to preserve its political power. Nevertheless Khan remains a Pakistani national hero. Despite his participation in nuclear proliferation schemes, Pakistanis see him as a patriot who earned Pakistan international respect in its darkest hour. Can both narratives be true at the same time?